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Alexandre Caeiro
The making of the fatwa
The production of Islamic legal expertise in Europe
This article examines the kind of expertise that is provided by Muslim actors
specialized in Islamic Law (muftis) to their coreligionists in Europe. It seeks to
understand how the production of this expertise (the fatwa) is organized and
managed, and to what extent it is shaped by policy discourses in the West. Social
scientists working on Islam in Europe seem to have by and large neglected the
genre of fatwas. 1 Although there may be a variety of reasons for this, including
those related to the conventional disciplinary boundaries, this neglect is unfortu-
nate given that the fatwa provides unique windows into the projects, desires,
and fears of Muslim individuals and communities living in specific contexts. In
the current context of institutionalization of Muslim authority in Europe and a
growing interest and concern for Muslim minorities in the Islamic heartlands,
fatwas are also an adequate place to explore the links between the production
of local Islamic discourses and the circulation of transnational ones. They often
give rise to heated debates within the Muslim communities of Europe, in peer
study groups as in Internet fora, in mosques as in printed magazines—debates
which, like their equivalents in the Arab world, are saturated with questions of
authenticity, legitimacy and authority (Hamzah, 2005: 183), and which should
particularly interest social scientists. 2
1. In his 1994 study Philip Lewis noted that muftis “have remained largely invisible in
studies on Muslim communities in Britain” (1994: 115). Despite some notable exceptions the
observation is still largely valid today across Europe. A similar assessment has repeatedly been
made by one of the pioneers in this field, P. S. van Koningsveld (2006). See also Rohe (2007).
2. To compound the problem the few studies that have dealt with fatwas have often been
marred by a number of problematic assumptions. Jytte Klausen, in her celebrated study The
Islamic Challenge. Politics and Religion in Western Europe, provocatively titled one of the sub-
chapters “Hermeneutics or Fatwas?” In Klausen’s reading, fatwas are not only detached from
both “hermeneutics” and “spirituality”, but also explicitly opposed to “historicity” and “contex-
tual interpretation” (2005: 156)—an unfortunate claim given that “fatwas change according
to time, place and situation” and function precisely as a mode of dealing with contingency in
Islamic Law (Hallaq, 1994; Johansen, 1999).
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Although individual muftis continue to issue fatwas, the production of Islamic
legal expertise is increasingly becoming a collective process. The institutionaliza-
tion of collective ijtihad—as the practice is known—has been seen as an acknow-
ledgement of the complexity of the modern world, where no single individual
is able to master all the relevant branches of knowledge (Masud, Messick &
Powers, 1996). It is also sometimes portrayed as a realistic response to the cur-
rent shortage of absolute mujtahids (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 2009). The institutional-
ization of collective fatwa bodies can therefore be said to constitute one of the
strategies through which the ulama have attempted to remain relevant in the
face of the challenges of modernity (Zaman, 2002).
The focus of this study is the European Council for Fatwa and Research
(hereby ECFR). Established in London in March 1997 by the Federation of
Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), 3 the ECFR is committed to the elabora-
tion of a Muslim jurisprudence for minorities (fiqh al-‘aqalliyyat) through the
production and dissemination of contextualized religious advice for Muslims
living in Europe. Its fatwas aim at “protecting the identity” of European Muslims
while “facilitating their integration”. Whether the ECFR succeeds in this project
depends, of course, on the way integration is defined—and on who defines it—
at any particular juncture.
In this article I offer an account of the fatwa’s universe by exploring ethno-
graphically the spaces, persons and processes involved in its production in
Europe. 4 The paper is based primarily on participant observation of four ses-
sions of the ECFR—in Paris in July 2002, Dublin in January 2003, Stockholm
in July 2003, and London in July 2004. These observations are complemented
by readings of the texts issued by the ECFR and over twenty interviews con-
ducted with members and close observers.
The Setting
Meetings between Islamic scholars to discuss the issues related to Muslims
in the West have been taking place irregularly since at least the 1970s. Although
it has not always been the ground on which Muslim discussions on their presence
in Europe have taken place, fiqh seems to have become in the context of the global
Islamic Revival an increasingly important discursive constraint. Established in
1983, the Union des organisations islamiques de France (UOIF) organized two
3. The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe is an umbrella body based in Brussels
and comprising Muslim associations in Western and Eastern Europe, including the Union des
organisations islamiques de France (UOIF) and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB). It is
linked to the ethos of the Muslim Brotherhood.
4. For inspirational ethnographies of the fatwa in different contexts see Agrama 2010 and
Messick 1993. For a different, “praxiological” approach to Islamic legal debates which is also
relevant here see Dupret, 2007.
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scholarly gatherings in the first half of the 1990s in its newly formed imam-
training institute, the Institut européen de sciences humaines (IESH) set in the
rural site of Château-Chinon (Nièvre). The discussions and decisions reached at
those meetings—on issues of Muslim settlement in Europe, citizenship, interest-
bearing transactions, the headscarf, and others—were not widely publicized. By
establishing the ECFR, the leaders of the FIOE (of which the UOIF is one of the
main members) sought to institutionalize these ad hoc reflections and provide
the necessary framework for disseminating the collective opinions.
The sessions of the ECFR have taken place once or twice a year since 1997.
With a few notable exceptions, they have been held in a hotel or conference
room of an Islamic centre located in the suburb of a European capital, reflecting
the geographical distribution of the Muslim diasporic communities. The functional,
purpose-built Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) in Clonskeagh—in the
southern outskirts of Dublin—has provided a secluded location particularly ame-
nable to these debates. Since the early 2000s it is here that the secretary-general
finalizes and then disseminates the general statement of each meeting of the ECFR.
Located at the periphery of the European Union, in a country where debates on
Islam have until recently been less vivid (and less hostile) than elsewhere, the
ICCI’s current prominence as the headquarters of the ECFR is the product of
the convergence between three main factors. Financial capital comes from the
oil-rich Arabian Gulf, in particular Sheikh Rashid Hamdan al-Maktoum, Deputy
Prime Minister of Dubai, whose Dublin-based Charitable Foundation built the
ICCI in the late 1990s and funds both its activities as well as the ECFR’s. The
Egyptian state provides religious expertise: the ICCI is staffed with Azharis paid
by the Egyptian Ministry of Religious Endowments, including the imam of the
Centre—and the ECFR’s current secretary-general—Shaykh Hussein Halawa. 5
The ICCI’s centrality in the minority fiqh project results also from the decentrali-
zation policy of the FIOE, which has deliberately spread its main institutions
across European nation-states, to minimize perhaps the effects of a potential
clampdown (in memory of the tribulations of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
Arab world). If it has sometimes been argued that Europe provides a unique
space of freedom for the elaboration of Islamic thought, the specter of illegality,
travel restrictions and other bans which hovers over the constellation of actors
and institutions involved in the fiqh al-‘aqalliyyat project serves as a reminder
that such freedom is today far from unbounded.
While Dublin has been the most common location for the ECFR meetings,
the venue changes as the Council’s leadership seeks to use the opportunity to
5. Hussain Halawa replaced Abd Allah al-Judai as secretary-general of the ECFR when
the fatwa body’s headquarters moved from Leeds to Dublin at the turn of the millennium.
Halawa is not a member of the FIOE or the Muslim Brotherhood but maintains a very close
relation to Qaradawi. He is also chairman of the Irish Council of Imams (founded in Septem-
ber 2006).
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meet local Muslim communities, interact with state authorities, and expand its
audience—in other words, to fulfill the aim of becoming a “recognized religious
authority” in the European continent. From 1997 to 2011 the ECFR convened
21 sessions in eight different cities: Dublin, Istanbul, Köln, London, Paris, Sarajevo,
Stockholm and Valencia.
The European responses to the ECFR have ranged from the enthusiastic
through the indifferent to the hostile. The prestige of the ECFR’s chairman Yusuf
al-Qaradawi usually ensures a keen reception in Western cities with large Arab
populations. On occasion, however, the meetings of the ECFR have been over-
shadowed by negative media coverage (including paparazzi standing outside the
hotel), as happened in London in July 2004. 6 On other occasions, the members
of the ECFR have received almost a statesman-like welcome by the local political
authorities—in Valencia, Spain, as well as in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like
other religious communities, Muslims in Europe are polarized. In the early 2000s
Salafi groups stood outside the ICCI in Dublin distributing leaflets while the
members were convening inside the Islamic Centre. The leaflets condemned the
ECFR’s fatwas as “misguided” and the institution as “political” and included
the counter-opinions of the late Saudi scholars Ibn Baz and Ibn ‘Uthaymin. Dur-
ing the meetings (or soon afterwards), government officials will occasionally be
asked by the media and opposition parties whether it is “right” to allow such
scholars into the country. Given the post-9/11 tone of public debates on Islam
in Europe, discretion sometimes appears to be the best support that vigilant state
actors can provide to the ECFR.
This politicized atmosphere undoubtedly contributes to the relative isolation,
if not secrecy, which often surrounds the meetings of the ECFR. The homogene-
ity of the setting—a scarcely decorated conference room—and the bleak land-
scapes of European suburbia where the meetings are usually held provide a sharp
contrast to the global interconnectedness and media exposure of the scholarly
debates taking place inside. Fiqh al-aqalliyyat has become an established field
of research, drawing interest and attention from a large spectrum of religious
scholars, Muslim activists, policy makers and social scientists—from Australia
and the United States to Malaysia and China. The leadership of the ECFR has
a large transnational audience (Qaradawi has been called a “global mufti” for
some reason). Journalists dispatched from Cairo record the proceedings and
write daily reports of the debates for www.islamonline.net, perhaps the most
prominent Islamic portal on the Internet; 7 parts of the discussions and interviews
with the scholars are sometimes shown at the satellite TV station Al-Jazeera;
6. Qaradawi was criticized in the British media for his positions regarding women, homo-
sexuality and suicide-bombing. For details of the controversy, and how it reshaped the sub-
sequent reception of Qaradawi in Western Europe, see Caeiro, Saify, 2009.
7. A disagreement in March 2010 between the Qatari board of Islamonline and its Egyptian
staff led to the establishment of a new website, www.onislam.net, where much of the original
content has now moved. See for details Abdel-Fadil, 2011.
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the meeting’s resolutions are published and discussed in fora such as the daily
newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, the Kuwaiti periodicals Al-Mujtama‘ and Al-Wa‘i
al-Islami, and the (recently-discontinued) magazine of the FIOE Al-Urubiyya-not
to mention a plethora of other locations on the Internet. Although the primary
discursive field in which the ECFR operates is arguably located in the Muslim
world, and particularly the dynamics of the Islamic Revival, the Council’s active
engagement in national and European debates about the integration of Muslims
has drawn attention from mainstream media such as the BBC, The Guardian,
Le Monde and The Wall Street Journal. Since 2008, the debates are even broad-
cast live through the ECFR’s website (www.e-cfr.org) to a global audience. This
remarkable public orientation makes the scholars acutely aware that by issuing
a collective fatwa, they are taking position in a larger debate about the relevance
of Islamic Law in the modern world.
The Actors
Members of the ECFR consist of some thirty Islamic scholars, coming from
different parts of Europe, North America, and the Muslim world. They include
a “professor” (Qaradawi), two “qadis” (the Lebanese scholar Faysal Mawlawi
and the Mauritanian judge Ali Salim), a dozen “doctors” (the scholars with a
PhD) and many “shaykhs”—the basic expression of scholarly status. 8 If the term
“fatwa” is employed to designate most of the discursive products issued by the
ECFR (including those that do not originate in a question from a petitioner), the
term “mufti”, derived from the same root, is scantly used by the actors involved.
According to the internal statutes of the Council, the scholars have to meet
five conditions to qualify as apt to issue fatwas for Muslims in Europe:
– Possess the appropriate shari‘a qualifications at university level, or to have been
committed to the meetings and circles of scholars and subsequently licensed by them,
and to have a good command of the Arabic language;
– be of good conduct and commitment to the regulations and manners of Islamic
shari‘a;
– be a resident of the European continent;
– be knowledgeable in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) as well as being aware of the
current social surroundings;
– be approved by the majority of [the Council’s] members (ECFR 2002: 4-5).
The ECFR is testimony to the desire to relocate Muslim authority in the
West. Islamic scholarship, however, still appears rooted in the heartlands of the
Islamic world. Exceptions to residence in Europe (point 3) can thus be made for
8. “Professor” (ustadh) is used here as an honorific term and reserved to the chairman of
the ECFR. In its more common acception, the title of professor would apply to many other
members (Ujayl al-Nashmi, Abd Allah Bin Bayyah, Abd al-Sattar Abu Ghudda) who teach in
the shari‘a faculties of universities in the Arab World. The complete list of ECFR members is
available at www.e-cfr.org
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those who do not live in Europe but nevertheless “carry the worries and anxieties
of their fellow Muslims in Europe, visit them on a frequent basis and appreciate
their conditions and living situation” (ECFR 2002: IX). Their number should not
exceed 25%, according to the statutes adopted in 1997. Although this percentage
increased further at the turn of the millennium as the leadership of the ECFR
pursued a policy of inclusion of muftis based in the Muslim world (to prevent
criticism from other Islamic institutions), the policy seems to have been reversed
since the establishment of the International Union of Muslim Scholars in London
in July 2004. 9 Advocates of minority fiqh currently have to work through the
disjuncture arising out of their various geographical locations (in other words,
their operation in a global field), on the one hand, and their commitment to
setting symbolic boundaries (designing a fiqh for minorities), on the other.
The internal statutes stipulate that the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence
and the size of the Muslim populations of European countries must be propor-
tionally represented in the Council. 10 Currently, Britain and France accordingly
provide the greatest contingent of scholars (6 and 5 respectively). While all the
French-based scholars come from North Africa and work (or have worked)
closely with the Union des organisations islamiques de France, the scholars in
the UK exhibit greater heterogeneity. They include a leading Tunisian Islamist
exiled in London (Rashid Ghannushi), a formal member of the Muslim Brother-
hood and, until recently, the president of the FIOE (Ahmad al-Rawi), an Iraqi
hadith specialist based in Leeds (Abd Allah al-Judai), the Manchester-based
Lybian scholar Salim al-Shaykhi, and two South Asian scholars of Deoband and
Ahl al-Hadith sensibilities (Bradford’s Ismail Kashhoulvi and London’s Suhaib
Hasan). Milli Görüs is represented by two Turkish scholars based in Germany.
The Bosnian Grand Mufti Mustafa Ceric´ and Muhammad Sadiq, a German
convert who joined the ECFR in the early 2000s, are the only native Europeans
(outside Turkey). Countries such as Spain, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland
provide one member each—while Italy, Austria, and Eastern Europe outside
Bosnia-Herzegovina are absent. 11 There are also three members from the Fiqh
9. The International Union of Muslim Scholars is a large association of Muslim scholars
headed by Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Abd Allah Bin Bayyah. Officially based in Dublin, it operates
mostly from its Cairo branch, where the Egyptian lawyer Muhammad Salim al-Awwa acts as
secretary-general.
10. The juristic school in which each individual member was primarily trained in is gener-
ally known and taken into consideration in the discussions. However, differences between
Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi‘i scholars seem considerably less important today than in
the past due to the wide acceptance of inter-juridical reasoning or talfı¯q (Krawietz, 2002). For
the leadership of the Council, borrowing from different schools is a key instrument for facili-
tating the lives of Muslims (taysı¯r fı¯-l-fatwa): talfı¯q has become inextricably linked to taysı¯r
(Qaradawi, 1995). By contrast, the members known in the Council for being against “facilita-
tion” seem to care more for the madhhab than their counterparts.
11. The late chairman of the Islamic Community in Albania Sabri Koçi, and the then Grand
Mufti of Bulgaria Mustafa Illish Hajji were invited to be members of the ECFR. They were
removed from the Council’s membership list for failing to attend the collective meetings.
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Council of North America (Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Jamal Badawi and Salah Sultan)
sitting in the ECFR. Despite the FIOE’s professed effort to include the diversity of
Islamic tendencies present in Europe (Rawi, personal communication, Leicester
2002), the ECFR remains exclusively male and Sunni, overwhelmingly Arab
in ethnicity, and close to the “middle-ground” (wasatøiyya) ethos of Yusuf al-
Qaradawi and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Members of the ECFR share a commitment to fiqh, which remains the
ground in which solutions to the problems of Muslims are sought. They also all
have relatively acute senses of a particular geopolitical location, envisaging their
role as one of “building bridges” between Islam and the West in a time domi-
nated by clash-of-civilization talk. The cosmopolitanism and heterogeneity of
the group are nevertheless quite striking. The ECFR’s members include Ministers
of Justice or Religious Affairs in the Arab World and Islamists banned from
their home countries; wealthy faculty deans and professors of shari‘a in the
Gulf alongside religious entrepreneurs who often struggle to make ends meet in
Western Europe; scholars actively working at the forefront of the digitilization
of Islamic knowledge, and imams with very limited levels of cyber-literacy; muf-
tis who navigate effortlessly across the traditional schools of jurisprudence, and
those firmly committed to one madhhab. Although the council’s chairman
considers ijtihad an “obligation” (Qaradawi, in ECFR 2002: 4), the ECFR even
included one scholar—the Egyptian-Belgian Mahmud Mujahid Hassan—who
until his retirement considered that it was not allowed to engage in ijtihad in
the present times (personal communication, Brussels, 2002).
The ECFR scholars also occupy divergent positions in the global Islamic
field. Many of them are definitely part of what we might call the orthodox
establishment. They move in the Arabic-language “global public space of norma-
tive reference and debate” (Bowen, 2004: 880) that characterizes contemporary
Muslim fiqh. Mobile figures who travel around the (Muslim) world, some mem-
bers of the ECFR are also regular speakers at various international fiqh conferen-
ces organized by the Muslim World League, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Religious
Endowments (and its newly established Global Centre for Wasatiyya), and other
public or private institutions across the Arab world. Quite a number of scholars
(Abd al-Sattar Abu Ghudda, Abd Allah Bin Bayyah, Muhammad Hawari, Ali
Qaradaghi, Taqi al-Din Uthmani) are affiliated to or have presented papers in
the meetings of the prestigious international fiqh councils based in Saudi Arabia.
They publish in the prestigious Islamic legal periodicals that have sprung up in
the Muslim world since the 1970s. Many sit in the shari‘a boards of Islamic
banks (Uthmani, Qaradawi, Bin Bayyah) and have developed extensive media
networks: Qaradawi, Mawlawi, Bin Bayyah, Ajil Nashmi and others have
their own personal websites; Qaradaghi is currently the deputy-director of
www.IslamOnLine.net. In addition to published fatwa collections, a few have
their own weekly fatwa shows in satellite TV stations: Bin Bayyah in Iqra,
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Qaradawi in Al-Jazeera, Salim al-Shaykhi in Risala. Although some of these
figures are based in the West, most of them actually reside in the Gulf. Despite
visa restrictions, many of the scholars from the Muslim World also meet their
counterparts based in Europe when they travel to the West to participate in the
conferences and festivals of the Muslim Diaspora (such as the meeting of French
Muslims at the Bourget organised by the UOIF in France, the annual conference
of the Muslim Association of Britain, etc). In the internal discussions they speak
with the self-confidence of men supported by a vibrant historical tradition. They
deliver the opening speeches and chair the sessions, which do not start before
they arrive, moderating and often setting the tone of the collective discussions.
Although the ethos of ijtiha¯d, the language of wasatøiyya and the invocation of
the maqa¯søid which characterize this group of scholars have become increasingly
widespread, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and his peers occupy a position of dominance
within the ECFR that they do not have in other international fiqh councils. This
seems to explain why Qaradawi himself has regularly lauded the ECFR’s work, 12
and why he has been keen to reproduce the experiment at a larger level through
the recently-established International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS). The
collective fatwas borrow extensively from their individual fatwas—especially
those of Qaradawi. And yet, for those members who reside outside Europe,
their membership of a European Council is considered problematic. It is deemed
“exceptional” in the internal statutes, and their precise percentage has been the
object of regulation during the ECFR’s administrative sessions. Qaradawi him-
self in Al-Shari‘a wa-l-Hayat has been asked to explain why “Eastern” scholars
can sit in a Western council, and to what extent they can actually understand
the issues that Muslim minorities in Europe face.
In contrast to this group of scholars, there are a number of individuals sitting
in the ECFR who perceive themselves—and often are perceived by the others—
as outsiders. These scholars are usually based in Europe and include members
of the FIOE (the institution which has founded the ECFR and which is widely
perceived to control the internal proceedings). Although formally trained in
Islamic Law and its adjunct sciences, most of the Europe-based scholars do not
have the impressive religious credentials of their Middle-Eastern partners. With
the exception of the scholars from the South Asia Diaspora (Suhaib Hassan,
Ismail Kashhoulvi in the UK and the Norway-based Mahbub al-Rahman), ECFR
members based in Europe rarely dress in the traditional clothes of the religious
scholar, preferring a Western suit-and-tie outfit (perhaps as a sign of modesty?)
These scholars speak less in the collective meetings, and more tentatively; they
tend to be more sensitive (and vulnerable) to local state policies and public
debates, and worry more about how the fatwas will be received in their national
12. Al Sharq al-Awsat, “A Talk with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi”, 8/4/2008, available at
http://www.asharqalawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=12353
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contexts. Quite often, they express their dissent by invoking the need to take
the context (al-waqi‘) into consideration. It is because of their presence in the
ECFR that a vocal opponent of the minority fiqh project, the Damascene Sa‘id
Ramadan al-Buti, has been able to argue that most of the members of the Euro-
pean fatwa council have “no relation to fiqh” whatsoever (Buti, 2007: 152)—an
accusation that has elicited a denial in the ECFR’s own periodical. If they are
referred to as the “non-specialists” in critiques of the ECFR, they nevertheless
have a legitimacy that the “specialists” from the Muslim world do not have—a
legitimacy that comes from living in the West (and needing to engage with non-
Muslim authorities), and that they are able to invoke to push their points of
view in the collective discussions.
Other scholars in the ECFR appear to be somewhat marginal in the collective
discussions not because of their religious capital but because they are tied to
other transnational Muslim networks. This is the case of the scholars from
Turkey and South Asia who are affiliated to specific Muslim organizations (Milli
Görüs, Ahl al-Hadith). They relate their fiqh positions primarily to the expecta-
tions of their communities and to the wider aims of the movement.
Although the external image of the ECFR is often a monolithic one, 13 there
are therefore several factors which contribute to internally differentiate its mem-
bers, including age, charisma, mother language, country of residence, disciplinary
training, formal membership in other Muslim organizations, and hermeneutical
approaches. The ability to cultivate a space of scholarly debate that cuts across
these boundaries depends upon the success of the deliberative process to establish
a form of consensus.
The Deliberation
The task at hand is to issue fatwas that can “meet the needs of Muslims in
Europe, solve their problems, and regulate their interaction with the European
societies” (ECFR 2002: 2, italics mine). 14 The fatwa is seen here as a “craft”
13. Muslim and non-Muslim critics of the ECFR often present the fatwa body as an institu-
tion tied to the Ikhwani ideology (in particular, the understanding of Islam as a “comprehensive
system” promoted by the Muslim Brothers or al-ih˚wa¯n al-muslimu¯n). While Salafi-Wahhabi
scholars criticize the ECFR for being tied to the “political organization” of the Muslim Brother-
hood, at the Grande Mosquée de Paris (GMP) the ECFR is referred to as a “Wahhabi institu-
tion” based on the idea that Ikhwani and Wahhabi groups are part of the same broad ideological
configuration—the salafiyya—that has displaced the traditional authority of the madhhab.
14. There are in fact two main discursive products coming out of the sessions of the ECFR:
answers to questions (fatawa), and collective resolutions (qararat) on issues requiring—accord-
ing to the muftis—an authoritative Islamic position. The boundaries between the two genres
are in fact quite blurred, not only because a question from a petition may be reformulated in
more abstract terms and be made the object of a resolution, but also because the issues that
are put forward by individual members often originate in actual questions they were asked in
their local context.
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(Bin Bayyah, 2007) which must simultaneously protect the identity of Muslims
(including “forgetful Muslims”) by reiterating the relevance of the shari‘a and
adapt Islam to the diasporic contexts in which the Muslim communities of
Europe live.
Many of the issues that are collectively discussed in the ECFR meetings come
in the form of questions from Muslims living in Europe. These questions are
usually sent by letter, fax or email to the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland,
where the ECFR’s secretary-general receives, organizes, and sometimes forwards
the questions to members known for their expertise in the field. The institutional
framework of the ECFR and the limited time of each session do not allow all
questions to be answered. 15 Questions directly relayed by members of the ECFR
stand a greater chance of being collectively debated during the session. Certain
issues deemed to be consensual—such as the obligation for a Muslim woman to
wear the headscarf—will simply not be discussed. Issues deemed to be too politi-
cally-sensitive (such as homosexuality) may also be put aside. Questions arrive
from Western and Eastern Europe alike, mostly from Arabic-speaking Muslims,
often working in institutions associated with the FIOE. 16 The responses of the
ECFR to these queries constitute fatwas in the traditional sense: answers by
religious experts to questions emanating from believers.
The challenge for the muftis in this exercise is the lack of interaction with
the petitioners. Except in those cases where the petitioner is known to one of the
scholars, the questioner is a complete stranger. Sometimes factual information
considered unimportant by the petitioner—but crucial for the mufti’s interpretive
work—may be missing: Under what precise circumstances did the husband pro-
nounce a triple talaq, and were there any conditions—such as anger or drunken-
ness—that might invalidate the pronouncement? What was the “breach of the
shari‘a” which the sinful imam committed that has led members of his congrega-
tion to question whether they can pray behind him at the mosque?
Muftis are trained to be sceptical of petitioners: the adab al-mufti literature
which lays out guidelines for issuing fatwas is replete with warnings against
people who ask irrelevant or misleading questions to test or ridicule the religious
scholar. In the case of the ECFR, the formulation of the question often confronts
the members with other scholarly opinions (expressions like “some claim that”
and its variants are recurrent). The set of questions that experienced muftis rou-
tinely ask petitioners in order to ascertain the sincerity, the level of religious
commitment, and the psychological importance attached by the petitioner to
15. Although it is possible to have the question answered by the ECFR’s regional fatwa
commissions in France or Britain, in practice this does not seem to happen systematically.
16. Although the fatwas published in the two collections mention explicitly only Belgium,
Britain, Germany, Poland and the United States, fatwas have also been issued in answer to
requests from Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Sweden,
Switzerland.
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the problem at hand, is impossible to replicate in this setting. To borrow a
commonly-used metaphor, the petitioner’s absence makes the diagnosis of the
spiritual illness difficult, rendering the provision of a remedy in the form of a
fatwa all the trickier.
The muftis try to counter this absence through a careful reading of the peti-
tion—a reading which seeks to lay bare not only the factual details but also the
particular sensibility of the petitioner. Sometimes the formulation of the question
hints clearly at what the desired answer is: the woman who asks whether her
husband has “the right” to prevent her from visiting her parents, like the wife
who enquiries whether it is permissible for the husband to live off her income,
and the mother who wonders if she has “the right” to rest after giving birth,
are all seeking an authoritative opinion that will allow them to make an Islamic
claim in a domestic dispute. 17 The muftis often oblige. On the other hand, a
question which is seen as lacking a commitment to traditional fiqh may elicit a
contemptuous answer, even when that answer clashes with the logic of the
ECFR’s project. By contrast, a leading question which clearly tries to push the
boundaries of traditional fiqh but shows an awareness of and sensitivity to the
Islamic legal tradition has a chance of mobilizing the energy of the Council’s
members.
The answers of the ECFR try to be comprehensive, outlining different possi-
bilities and their corresponding rulings in order to make up for any missing
information, without taking much shared knowledge for granted. The scholar
who drafts the fatwa proposal is expected to engage with the authoritative
Islamic texts (especially the Qur’an and Sunna); to disclose the reasoning that
underlies the opinion; and to inscribe the specific issue in a broader narrative
structure. This methodology founds the regulatory power which the muftis
attribute to their fatwas. It also transforms an individual question into an oppor-
tunity for da‘wa and tarbiyya—for showing the comprehensiveness of Islam and
for inculcating the virtues necessary to live a pious Muslim life. Hence, the
answer to a question about the marriage of a Muslim woman without her legal
guardian (walı¯) starts with an evocation of the importance of marriage in Islam
(ECFR 2002: 128); an enquiry about the collection of zaka¯t by Muslim NGOs
in the West elicits an exposition of the functions of alimony in Muslim society
(ECFR 2002: 116).
The wide range of sensibilities of ECFR affiliates is demonstrated by the very
different literary styles and tones adopted in the texts. While some fatwas seem
to be formulated in neutral terms, others are quite passionate about their subject
matter. The fatwa’s own distribution of moral responsibility explains why the
17. In one instance it is actually the husband who is seeking a fatwa in order to counter
his wife’s claims: “Is it compulsory upon a husband (father) to attend educational courses which
teach how to solve children’s problems?” (First session, ECFR 2002: 79).
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conventional legal criteria of “detachment” and “objectivity” (Latour 2004) do
not seem to arise in this setting. 18 Although the fatwa is not legally binding, the
mufti and the petitioner are ethically bound to each other; they will both be held
accountable (albeit in different ways) for the fatwa: how the mustafti presented
his case; what the mufti said; how the petitioner acted upon it, and the conse-
quences of this action (Ibram n/d; see also Agrama, 2010).
The kind of fatwa-giving which I have described above typically occupies
only one of the four days of the ECFR’s meeting. In recent years the sessions of
the ECFR have been largely structured around the presentation of research
papers and the drafting of authoritative opinions on issues that do not necessarily
originate in questions from Muslim communities. These texts do not strictly-
speaking partake in the same moral universe of the fatwa which I have described
above, but they seek to bind their addressees through a mode of interpellation
that also draws on the performative power of Muslim ethical speech (Caeiro,
2010). In the absence of a specific question, how do the scholars go about pro-
ducing a text that will be disseminated in their name? What are the criteria that
define an apt statement in this context? And what precisely is to be debated?
The choice of topics worthy of study and collective deliberation is collegial.
Sometimes the choice clearly responds to concerns internal to Muslim communi-
ties. Family issues—especially marriage and divorce—arguably absorb most of
the time of the imams officiating in mosques across Europe. A few sessions of
the ECFR have been devoted to discussing the general frameworks as well as
the precise rules of Muslim family matters in Europe. Likewise, the calculation
of the prayer timetable and the month of Ramadan as well as the thorny issue
of financial transactions involved myriad forms of forbidden usury (riba¯) are
questions which have been discussed at great length both within Muslim commu-
nities and at the ECFR.
On other occasions, the topics relate much more directly to the way debates
on Islam in Europe are framed in the public sphere: The ECFR produced a
fatwa on “jihad and its relation to terrorism” in the aftermath of 9/11; issued
a statement on the French proposal to ban the headscarf in public schools in
January 2004; and initiated in 2007 a reflection on the uses and abuses of the
concept of “integration” as it is deployed in Europe today.
Since a statement (qara¯r) is not bound by a specific question, part of the
discussion between the members is precisely about setting the terms and parame-
ters of the collective discussion: should the ECFR’s condemnation of terrorism
mention the “special case” of the Palestinian struggle, or would making that
18. In his rich ethnographic study of the workings of the Conseil d’État in France, Bruno
Latour often contrasts the legal institution with the scientific laboratory. His study however
also offers interesting points of comparison with the universe of the fatwa.
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distinction explicit in the current climate serve primarily the interests of the pro-
Zionist lobby? Does engaging Tantawi’s comments on France’s right to ban the
hijab from its public schools diminish the impact of Shaykh Al-Azhar’s opinion
or merely contribute to the public display of Muslim divisiveness? To what
extent should the ECFR follow public debates in conflating integration and anti-
terrorism agendas?
The deliberative process leading to the collective fatwa is similar to that which
culminates in the resolution. Both typically require numerous drafts, lengthy
discussions, and some patient negotiation. A previously-issued fatwa by a recog-
nized religious authority is often the starting point of the discussion. The ECFR
scholars draw on the textual production of their own members (especially
Qaradawi), the two major international fiqh councils (the Muslim World
League’s Islamic Fiqh Council in Mecca and the Fiqh Academy of the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah), and a variety of fatwa bodies in the
Muslim world (Al-Azhar, Kuwait’s fatwa commission, the Saudi Commission
of High Scholars). Many of the relevant fatwa collections are available electroni-
cally and easily accessible during the meetings. Staff from IslamOnLine covering
the session for the website may distribute printouts of the relevant fatwas from
their online fatwa database (the Arabic fatwas are in fact often the individual
opinions of some of the scholars attending the meeting such as Qaradawi,
Mawlawi or Ali al-Qaradaghi). The members disagree on whether the ECFR
should try to revise these fatwas or simply endorse them. The main thrust of the
ECFR’s approach is captured in a remark by Abd Allah Bin Bayyah during the
12th session of the Council in Paris. Growing increasingly frustrated about the
collective discussion on investing in the stock exchange, the Mauritanian burst
out—to general laughter—with the following remark: “if you want to forbid it
just call the international fiqh council [of the OIC] in Jeddah and let us all
go home”.
The role of the first drafter is important in setting the frame of the debate,
but it is not decisive. After the first draft is read aloud, passages are dropped,
elaborated or modified. Since the authority of the fatwa is deemed to be directly
proportional to its proximity to a general consensus, the ECFR’s leadership tries
to accommodate most of the objections which are formulated by the members.
Voting (by show of hands)—the constitutional method of resolving divisive
issues within fatwa bodies in general—is rarely practiced. Although it is theoreti-
cally possible to attach a dissenting opinion to the text of the collective fatwa,
this is seen as diminishing the authority of the ruling and therefore discouraged.
In one instance concerning the possibility of acquiring a house through an inter-
est-bearing loan, the failure of the ECFR’s leadership to attach the dissenting
opinion of three scholars to the published text of the fatwa led to their resigna-
tion (Caeiro, 2004). But consensus sometimes is difficult to reach; many issues
(including the following: defining the concept of fiqh al-aqalliyyat; deciding on
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the marital status of a married woman who converts to Islam while the husband
remains non-Muslim; establishing the prayer timetable; providing a definition
for terrorism) have to be adjourned once, or twice. Some—like the status of
meat products slaughtered by non-Muslims—have been indefinitely postponed.
When a consensual answer appears impossible, the leadership of the ECFR may
decide to produce the fatwa of one of its leading scholars instead: if the members
cannot agree on whether an interest-bearing loan to build an Islamic Centre
should be allowed, discouraged, or forbidden, a previously-issued fatwa by the
ECFR’s vice-chairman Faysal Mawlawi may be sent to the petitioner in order
to remove his burden...
What the muftis do in most of these debates is to engage in a hierarchization
of textual authorities, weighing different interests and establishing priorities—in
other words, they set about constructing, each time anew, what Qaradawi calls
a fiqh of balances and priorities (fiqh al-muwazanat wa fiqh al-awlawiyyat).
They discuss the following questions: How should one articulate specific injunc-
tions with general rules? What importance can be given to marginal opinions
from the fiqh heritage which contradict the views of the majority of the scholars?
When can specific Qur’anic statements or Prophetic sayings be suspended in
order to achieve the more abstract goals and aims of the shari‘a? And what
criteria should one use to determine these goals (maqa¯søid al-sharı¯‘a)? Further-
more, if the role of the mufti is to “make life easy” (ECFR 2002: XI), where
should the line between facility (taysı¯r) and negligence (tasa¯hul) be drawn? In
so far as Islamic normativity—particularly the fatwa—is responsive to the “real-
ity” of local Muslim communities, when can the understanding of the “context”
change the status of an Islamic ruling from forbidden to permissible (or vice
versa)? What are the meanings and fields of application of reform?
During the internal discussions scholars take a variety of positions on these
issues, sometimes change their mind, and (usually) eventually settle on a compro-
mise. Since the Prophet forbade interfaith inheritance in an authentic hadith, but
also stated that Islam does not harm the believer, should European converts to
Islam be allowed to inherit from their non-Muslim relatives? What is the level
of benefit that can outweigh such a Prophetic narration (and should benefit be
measured exclusively in material terms, or should it also include conformity to
the shari‘a)? Furthermore, if Muslims can be in a state of necessity for such
funds, does one measure the necessity in individual, regional, or global terms?
(Al shari‘a wa-l-hayat, 2001). 19
The Islamic normative tradition of fiqh has well-established methods for
resolving such conflicts of interest, providing standards for drawing analogies,
19. In the end the fatwa issued by the ECFR allows a Muslim to inherit from a non-Muslim
on grounds that the prohibition relates only to the “ka¯fir”, defined here as the one who is in
a state of war with Muslims (Resolution 1/5).
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differentiating between general and specific texts, prohibitions of ends and prohi-
bitions of means, or necessities and needs. These and other distinctions guide
the ECFR muftis in their deliberations. But fiqh has not abolished the subjectivity
involved in determining the appropriate balances and in facilitating the life of
believers without illicitly transgressing the textual limits. It is precisely because
the scholars acknowledge that such calculations necessarily involve a degree of
human arbitrariness that they insist on the requirements of dı¯n (religion) and
taqwa (piety) for the muftiship (Bishri, 2007).
This deliberative process is universal in scope. In Europe, however, it connects
with more specific questions about the integration of Muslims. The texts issued
by the ECFR should not only “solve problems” but also articulate the relevance
of Islamic normativity for Muslims living in Europe, fostering a sense of belong-
ing to the ummah (ECFR 2002: VIII). In order to do so the muftis sometimes
draw flattering comparisons between Islamic norms and positive laws, or try to
show how the former are in conformity with human nature. But the fatwas and
resolutions of the ECFR also have to be made relevant for the variety of Muslim
communities and the heterogeneity of European contexts. How should, for
example, the members of the ECFR understand the Qur’anic statement that the
meat slaughtered by Christians or Jews is licit for Muslims in the self-avowedly
secular contexts of Europe 20—particularly when Milli Görüs members have
helped establish a transnational network of halal meat products while the leader-
ship of the UOIF allowed the consumption of mainstream meat products (other
than pork) slaughtered by non-Muslims (and promoted that view as proof of its
positive contribution towards the integration of Muslims into the Republic)?
Given the strong emphasis placed by the leadership of the ECFR on conform-
ity with the Law, part of the task is to issue fatwas that stay within the limits
of the laws of the different European states. Furthermore, since the fatwa must
not “destabilize” the society (Ibram n/d), the production of a pan-European
fatwa also requires an assessment of the shifting moods of European audiences
regarding public religion in general, and Islam in particular. In other words, the
fatwa must gauge the boundaries of acceptable religious discourses at each
moment and across European countries in order to be able to serve “the interests
of Muslims” and “the interests of the societies they live in” (al-majalla al-‘ilmiyya
li-l-majlis al-urubı¯ li-l-ifta¯’ wa-l-buhø u¯th 12-3: 1).
Given the diversity of legal and institutional arrangements across Europe,
tensions often arise. Although post-9/11 debates on Islam have shown some
signs of convergence across Europe around the political rationalities of anti-
terrorism (Peter, 2008), the range of possibilities and constraints that European
Muslims encounter still varies significantly between countries in such crucial
20. The issue revolves in part around the question of Europe’s identity: in what sense is it
still Christian in the meaning implied by the Qur’anic revelation?
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issues as Muslim marriage contracts; the availability of Islamic financial alterna-
tives; the conditions for halal slaughtering; or the contexts for Muslim political
participation. When discussing these and similar questions, the relevance of
“Europe” as a framework for thinking about Islam often appears to the members
to be much less obvious than it is usually assumed. A discussion about the French
headscarf debate only a few months before the government’s decision to ban it
from public schools had materialized is instructive here since it revealed sharp
divisions between the French-based members of the UOIF and others. Wary of
the consequences of openly defying a proposed law which had gathered almost
universal support in France, the leaders of the UOIF sought a fatwa from the
ECFR stating that Muslim girls could go to public school without the head-
scarf—in other words, a reiteration of their own position since the 1990s. Dis-
tance from the French context and disengagement from local Muslim politics led
members such as Qaradawi to voice more vocal criticism. Collectively, members
argued about the appropriate tone and effective structure of justification for
expressing dissent and interpellating the French state. Ultimately, they crafted a
statement that acknowledged—at the request of the FIOE—the positive role of
the French state in the formation of the Conseil français du culte musulman
(where the UOIF was controversially made a prominent member).
The fatwas issued by the ECFR also stand in a complex relationship to the
practices of its Muslim addressees. The mufti cannot “follow people’s whims”,
a reference to a famous Qur’anic injunction which is often reiterated during the
ECFR’s internal discussions. And yet, the fatwa should be “accepted” by the
Muslim community: at least, it should not fall outside the (imagined) expecta-
tions and practices of Muslim believers (or their spokespersons). This respon-
siveness is part of what ECFR members call “a realistic fiqh”. Under these
conditions, what position should the ECFR adopt in relation to the lunar calen-
dar? How much attention should be paid to the actual practices of European
Muslim communities? Should the members encourage Muslims to follow astro-
nomical calculations in spite of their awareness that some will insist on the eye
sighting of the moon? Or should the ECFR try to reconcile its position regarding
astronomy with that of Saudi Arabia’s, which many Muslims regard as authori-
tative in these matters? These and other questions are the object of intense debate
within a collective fiqh council committed to a range of different projects.
Conclusion
Fiqh al-aqalliyyat has become an important topic for a large spectrum of
state and non-state actors of contemporary Islam. It connects variously with
the logic of integration discourses and the anti-terrorism agendas, providing an
example of how “the penetration of geopolitics into religious discourse impacts
the politics of knowledge production in the Muslim world” (Mandaville, 2007:
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112), including its Diaspora in the West. Attempts to lay out the principles of
minority fiqh, and to establish its relation to mainstream fiqh, have been pro-
duced in Britain, Egypt, France, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the USA.
The institution most closely associated with the concept of minority fiqh is the
European Council for Fatwa and Research, a body which aims at providing an
authoritative reading of the Islamic tradition in a context of migration and social
change. The complex deliberative process that I have described above suggests
that one can speak of minority fiqh only as an evolving project, diversely under-
stood and variously implemented, by the heterogeneous group of scholars that
sit in the ECFR.
The outcome of such deliberative processes is always marked by a particular
uncertainty. The muftis’ search for the ruling (høukm) appropriate to the parti-
cular case ultimately lies outside their control. They can merely hope to be
“guided”, but since that guidance is impossible to verify, the outcome is inher-
ently fragile. The fatwas can therefore be—and have been—revisited, revised, or
completely rewritten.
In addition to this structural or ontological fragility, the fatwas of the ECFR
are also prone to more specific uncertainties. One consequence of the multiple
authorships which underlie the collective text is that the fatwa will often defy a
yes-or-no definition; it may be incomplete and sometimes even (deliberately?)
miss the point. An inquiry into whether “Is it permissible for a Muslim to partici-
pate in the council elections in a European country, or to vote for a non-Muslim
party which may not serve the interests of Muslims?” is deferred to local Islamic
organizations. The question of whether a woman who converts to Islam may
remain married to her non-Muslim husband proved so controversial that the
“fatwa” issued by the ECFR merely outlines a range of positions without taking
sides for or against. Although it has been read by opponents and defenders of
the right of the woman to remain married with her husband as an authorization,
some members—including Mawlawi—have claimed that no fatwa has actually
been issued on the topic. 21 The collective fatwas of the ECFR will therefore not
only express a range of sensibilities but also allow multiple readings. How they
eventually circulate amongst Muslim and non-Muslim publics, and the kinds of
appropriations or subversions that may take place, lie ultimately outside of the
muftis’ control.
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21. In a live fatwa session on IslamOnLine a cyber-mustafti asked Faysal Mawlawi to
explain the ECFR’s fatwa authorizing a married woman to remain with her non-Muslim hus-
band after her conversion; Mawlawi replied that no fatwa had been issued.
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Abstract
This article examines the kind of expertise that is provided by Muslim actors special-
ized in Islamic Law (muftis) to their coreligionists in Europe. It seeks to understand
how the production of this expertise (the fatwa) is organized and managed, and to
what extent it is shaped by policy discourses in the West. The article thus seeks to
fill a relative gap in the scholarship on Islam in Europe which has often reduced
fatwas to ahistorical and fundamentalist rhetorics. Taking the European Council for
Fatwa and Reseach as a case study, the author describes the settings, actors and
logics of the production of fatwas in the European context.
Key words: Islam, Europe, fatwa, jurisprudence of minorities, European Council for
Fatwa and Research.
Résumé
Cet article examine le type d’expertise publique produite en Europe par des acteurs
musulmans spécialisés dans le droit musulman (muftis). Il explore la façon dont la
production d’une fatwa est organisée dans un contexte (post-)migratoire, et l’impact
que le discours politique et médiatique à propos de l’islam a sur cette production. Il
cherche à combler un vide relatif dans la recherche sur l’islam en Europe qui a
souvent réduit la fatwa à une rhétorique a-historique et fondamentaliste. En pre-
nant le Conseil européen de la fatwa et de la recherche comme exemple, l’auteur
décrit ainsi les cadres, les acteurs et les logiques de production de la fatwa dans le
contexte européen.
Mots-clés : islam, Europe, fatwa, jurisprudence des minorités, Conseil européen de
la fatwa et de la recherche.
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Resumen
Este artículo examina el tipo de pericias públicas producidas en Europa por actores
musulmanes especializados en el derecho musulmán (muftis). Se explora la manera
en que la producción de una fatwa se organiza en un contexto (post-)migratorio, y
el impacto que el discurso político y mediático a propósito del Islam tiene sobre esta
producción. El artículo intenta llenar un vacío relativo en la investigación sobre el
Islam en Europa, que ha reducido a menudo la fatwa a una retórica a-histórica y
fundamentalista. Tomando el Consejo europeo de la fatwa y de la investigación como
ejemplo, el autor describe así los marcos, los actores y las lógicas de producción de
la fatwa en el contexto europeo.
Palabras clave: Islam, Europa, fatwa, jurisprudencia de las minorías, Consejo euro-
peo de la fatwa y de la investigación.
